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Agenda
Approaches to defining Nunn-Lugar
Some important themes to consider
Expanding the Nunn-Lugar model
For the purposes of this presentation, “Nunn-Lugar” and “CTR” refer to all of the various 
programs managed by the U.S. Departments of Defense (DoD), Energy (DOE), State (DOS), 
etceteras, and their counterpart agencies in the former Soviet Union.  Although CTR is the 
official name only of the DoD program, there is no other convenient moniker with which to 
refer to all U.S. Government efforts in this area.
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Defining Nunn-Lugar
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What is Nunn-Lugar?
Descriptive:  mechanical approach
Theoretical:  conceptual approach
Taxonomy:  comparative approach
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Descriptive: The Nunn-Lugar Process





1.  This Treaty, including its Annexes, shall remain in force for 15 
days unless superseded earlier by as subsequent agreement to 
purchase equipment and services for the purposes of eliminating 
silo ICBMs.  If the Parties so decide, this Treaty shall be extended for 
a period of five years.  Upon expiration of the five years, the Treaty 
shall be subject to review and extension for successive five year 
periods in accordance with the procedures governing the initial 
extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five year 
period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent 
agreement on the elimination of silo ICBMs.
2.  A standing body, the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission, shall periodically review the viability of this treaty in 
light of  changing circumstances.  Said review shall occur not less 




The Contractor shall deliver the following goods or services in 
accordance with the  Statement of Work (Section J, Attachment #1) 
and the contract provisions within 90 days of sward.  This contract 
includes the following goods and services:
0001 Silo dismantlement construction services
for elimination of the Kyrgyz site
0002 Silo dismantlement construction services for elimination
of the Zhjakev site.
0003 Scrap salvage of usable material designated by COTR for 
salvage at the Kyrgyz site
0004 Scrap salvage of usable material designated by the COTR
for salvage at the Zhjakev site
B PLACE OF PERFORMANCE
All work called for under this contract shall be performed at the silo 


















6Charles L. Thornton RANSAC Threat Reduction Expansion Workshop 27 July 2004
Conceptual 1:  Broad Look
An arrangement through which states work together to address 
common security objectives, generally implemented below the 
formal treaty level, and involving the donation of equipment 
and services from one state to another
Effort to extend financial and technical support to dismantle 
delivery systems and to secure and control warheads and 
fissile materials
Evolution:  process of constructive engagement on a topic both 
sides would allow to occur
Common purpose – stable managerial control
Direct collaboration for mutual benefit, as opposed to 
deterrent relationship
Process of transformation of security relationship from 
confrontation to collaboration
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Conceptual 2:  Traditional Arms Control
1961: arms control and military strategy are not antithetical; 
indeed, arms control should be considered a supplementary 
means of achieving strategic objectives
Basic principles:
reducing the risk of war
reducing the cost of preparing for war
reducing the damage should war occur
1993: cooperative engagement became the appropriate 
principle for dealing with the new security threats
9/11: arms control no longer an independent endeavor with 
tenuous links to broader national and international security 
policies
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formal arms 
control treaties










Taxonomy 1:  Preventive Defense Continuum
CTR: links with above, but something new 
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Taxonomy 3:  Models for CTR





Foreign Aid:  Marshall Plan
Contain Communism
Post war
Intended to head off perceived 
threat vice existing forces
Buy American
Export American contracting 
and business practices
Cooperative Security:  CBMs
Intangibles




Collective Security:  NATO
NATO model of continual 
reassurances among historical 
adversaries
Akin to the Nunn-Lugar 
interaction of military officers, 
bureaucrats, business 
executives, and scientists
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formal arms 
control treaties










Evolution in Thinking About Nunn-Lugar
Nunn-Lugar supporting other policy tools
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Important Themes
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Dismantlement versus Nonproliferation
Original name:  Safe, Secure Dismantlement
Tension between two concepts/objectives of dismantlement & 
nonproliferation
US objectives/concerns versus Russian 
objectives/concerns
Original legislative emphasis on dismantlement, then quickly 
evolved toward nonproliferation
Nonetheless, stable managerial control over nuclear 
operations was prominent driver at original program 
conception
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Donor-Client Psychology
Important to US authorizers and implementers
“Our money” & “we’re the victors” attitude
Rejected principle of reciprocity
Significant impact on Russian perceptions
Psychology of dependence – real; resentment of it
Statutory linkages:  congressional certification requirements
Result: ‘coercive threat reduction’ [BGen Kuenning]
Where the process has worked well, the parties have 
subordinated this theme
Successful projects:  mutual relationship
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Nunn-Lugar Expansion
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Modes of Expansion
Vertical:  more of the same
Expanding existing FSU projects
Horizontal:  expansion of the cooperative aspects of the 
program to a conceptual basis for bilateral relations
Transforming the security relationship
Replacing, or at least subordinating, MAD
Geographical:  applied to other regions
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Generalizing the Model: Nunn-Lugar’s Drivers
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Economic and Industrial Development
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Thought Experiment:  Inventing Nunn-Lugar
What if we could start from scratch?
How would we design the program?
What are the alternative US policy options?  Should the 
program be implemented on its own, or in a supporting role?
Why would a state choose to accept foreign threat reduction 
assistance?  What are that state’s alternative policy options?  
Who would make that choice?
How would we want to measure the effectiveness/success of 
the program?
How would we design the life-cycle of the program?  What is 
the end point, or final objective?  What is the critical path; how 
do we get there?
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Conclusions
Are we currently in a position to initiate major new policy?
No:  dramatic changes in policy made only during formative moments
Therefore, the expansion of Threat Reduction must be evolutionary
Too much focus on the transferability of specific projects as designed to 
be implemented in the FSU
Better: focus on the transferability of the Nunn-Lugar principles as 
conceived in early post-Cold War era
Policy of incremental possibilities
Keep doors open
Adjust policies as needed
Build trust
Hope more doors open
